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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------------------------------COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
A UTAH CORPORATION,
Respondent-Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No.

15773

CORPORATION NINE,
A UTAH CORPORATION ET AL,
Appellant-Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondant (hereinafter referred to as
"bank") commenced this action to foreclose an assigned
real estate mortgage.

Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter

referred to as "Corporation") counterclaimed to recover
damages suffered because an officer, director and stockholder of the "bank" improperly obtained and used confidential information from the "corporation" loan application
materials.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury.

The Court direct-

ed a verdict against the "corporation's" counter-claim
denying access to the jury.

The "corporation" moved for sum-
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mary

judgment based on a tender to the "bank" of all

monies and interest accrued to the date on which the "Corporation" became aware of the new mortgage holder.

The

Court denied this motion and in the subsequent directed verdict, held against the "corporation" and allowed the "bank"
to proceed with foreclosure.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
1.

The "corporation" seeks to have set aside the

directed verdict against its counter-claim and be allowed to
have the case ajudicated by a jury.
2.

The "corporation" seeks to have its motion for

summary judgment granted or in the alternative to have the
facts determined by a jury.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The "corporation" entered into a mortgage and note
securing real property with LOIA R. HUGGINS and JOSEPH O.
HUGGINS on September 28, 1972.

Joseph O. Huggins died short·

ly after the first annual payment was made by the "corporation" on the note.

The property secured by the note and

mortgage was the subject of the probate of the estate of
Joseph O. Huggins until April 28, 1977.

This note and

mortgage were part of the financing and land acquisition
by the "corporation" for development of Gateway West Mobile
Home Estates,
(T-91, 197)

(herinafter referred to as Gateway West).
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The "bank" was assigned the note and mortgage of
Loia R. Huggins and Joseph O. Huggins in an instrument
bearing the date of May 3, 1977.
corded May 6, 1977.

This instrument was re-

Suit was filed to foreclose on the

note and mortgage on May 10, 1977.
No notice of the transfer of interest was given to
the

"corporation".
During the four and one-half year period prior to

the time the "bank" gained its interest, neither Loia R.
Huggins or Joseph 0. Huggins nor the estate of Joseph O.
Huggins had taken any action either to accelerate the debt
or to require strict compliance with the terms of the note
and mortgage.
The first knowledge that the "corporation" had that
Commercial Security Bank had acquired Huggins' interest
in the property was obtained when suit was filed.

At this

time, the "corporation" in writing, tendered all the principal and interest then due and owing.

The "bankn refused to

accept the funds so tendered and is currently refusing to
accept such funds.

(T-198)

In the fall of 1972 through the fall of 1973, the
circumstances relating to the "corporation's" counterclaim occured.

The "corporation" made application with

the "bank", to secure financing to develop Gateway West.
(T-92, 96)
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The "corporation" worked with Gordon Belnap, vice
president in charge of real estate, at Conunercial Security
Bank during these negotiations.
Gateway West was to be a four-star park, unique in
northern Utah.

The loan file of the "corporation" was

violated by Alan Nye, a director and shareholder of the
bank.

He used information from the corporations file to

build another park of the same quality as Gateway West. (T-611
The market analysis in the loan file and the analysi:[
done by the bank indicated the market would bear only one
park of this type.
The bank refused to distribute the last $21,000.00
of the loan.

Because of these acts of the bank and its

director, the "corporation" was unable to meet its obligation:
and suffered damage.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S COUNTER-CLAIM
The Utah Court and courts in general have
established a very high standard for granting directed
verdicts.

This is because of its drastic nature in the

removing the case from the jury.

In KOER vs. MAYFAIR

MARKETS, 431 P.2d 566; 19 Utah 2d 339;
" . • . All of the testimony and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, which tend to
prove the Plaintiff's case must be accepted as
true, and all conflicts and all evidence which
tend to disprove it must be disregarded.
And therefore, the fundamental issue presented on this appeal is whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, together with all reasonable inferences,
was sufficient to submit the case to the jury.
"
(emp~1:> cdded)
The Utah Supreme Court further explained the
requirement and preference in relation to a directed verdict
in SMITH vs. FRANKLIN, 376 P.2d 541; 14 Utah 2d 16; by
expressing the invariable rule that any doubts should be
resolved in favor of submitting disputed issues to a jury.
Additional citations abound, but the general rule
in Utah is found in the previously quoted cases and summarized in CURTIS vs. HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC. 575 P.2d 1644;
where the Court concluded that it would sustain a directed

-

5 -
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verdict only if the evidence was such that reasonable person::
could not find for the claimant even when the evidence is

i

I

I

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
while affording him the benefit of all inferences which the

I

evidence fairly supports.
Under this standard, this case should have gone to
the jury.

When looking at all the facts presented by the

"corporation," and drawing all reasonable conclusions from
those facts, while disregarding any conflict in facts or
evidence, it appears that a reasonable person could differ.
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POINT TWO
THE BANK HAD A DUTY NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CONTRACT
RIGHTS OF CORPORATION NINE
The basic relationship between the "bank" and the
"corporation""was that of loan agen,:::y and client.

This

created a duty in the bank not to prevent Corporation Nine
from performing on contracts for the development of Gateway
West.
In the process of applying for a loan, the
"corporation" supplied the bank with detailed, confidential
and valuable information regarding the viability and feasibility of building a four-star mobile home park in Weber
County.

This information was supplied by Corporation Nine

in the belief that the information would be used only in
the loan approval process.

Commercial Security Bank had a

duty, because of the undertaking of the loan, to protect the
information in this file.

The "corporation" justifiably

expected that no other use would be made of the information
and that the file would be maintained in a confidential and
appropriate manner.
The bank's duty to the "corpor&tion" was breached
by the acts of
Security Bank.

Alan Nye, an officer and director of Commercial
. A bank may be liable for the act of its

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
- 7 provided
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

officer or agent, even though he is acting soley for his own
purpose, if such act is within the apparent scope of his
authority." 10 Am Jur 2d, 105 Banks, Section 101.

Mr Nye

made improper and inappropriate use of the information
contained in Corporation Nine's loan file.
Mr. Nye looked through the entire loan file and
asked if copies could be made of the information contained
therein.

(T-61, 62, and 80)

The perusal of the loan file

took place after the loan had been approved by the bank.
(T-58, 62)
Mr. Nye and Mr. Belnap, on several occasions,
discussed the development of Mr. Nye's property.

Mr. Nye

indicated that he was not sure that a mobile home park was
a good proposal until after he used the documents in
Corporation Nine's file.

(T-62)

Mr. Belnap testified that Mr. Nye was taking a
particular interest in the development of Gateway West.
He made several visits to the site of the mobile home park
during its construction.

Mr. Belnap indicated that such a

visit by a director was very unusual and out of the ordinary.
(T-191)
Mr. Belnap indicated, on another occasion, that
Alan Nye was taking a particular interest in the development
of the project.

Mr. Belnap told Mr. New, "He (Nye) is lookir

at everything you bring in, and he has got a piece of land,

he is
to build
a park
onby the
it."
(T-103)
Sponsored by the and
S.J. Quinney
Lawgoing
Library. Funding
for digitization
provided
Institute
of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
- 8 -errors.

The interest which Alan Nye exhibited in the park
was highly unusual.

Mr. Belnap testified that this was the

only time that a director had taken such interest in a loan.
When asked if he could remember any specific instance when
Mr. Nye had looked at the "corporation's" file, Mr. Belnap
replied;
"I remember specifically because i t is the
only time it ever happened all the 17 years I
was at the bank that a loan officer or director
ever asked for someone's file."
(T-62)
Mr. Belnap knew what Mr. Nye was doing was improper.
Belnap went along with it because, ".
director what to do.

you don't tell a

He's the boss .

There is a general duty for one party not to interfere
with the contract rights of another.

The Utah Court in SOTER

vs. WASATCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 21 Utah 2d 244, 443 P. 2d
653, outlined the elements of interferrence with contract.
"In order to establish a right to recover on
such a cause of action the plaintiffs would have
to show that the defendants, without justification,
by some wrongful and malicious act, interfered
with the plaintiffs right of contract, and an actual
damage resulted."
The bank owed such a duty of noninterferenoe to this
"corporation" in all its activities, specifically in this
suit in relation to the mortgage between Huggins and the
"corporation."
There is an additional duty once a contract has been
entered not to prevent performance.

This principle is so
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eminently reasonable and so necessary to orderly commercial
transactions that it hardly needs citation.

"The act of one

party to an entire contract in preventing a completion of
the under taking gives a right of recovery. "
Contracts Section 382.

17 AmJur 2d

"There is no doubt that ordinarily

if one exacts a promise from another to perform an act, the
law implies a counter promise against arbitrary or unreason·
able conduct on the part of the promisee."

PSATY

&

FHURMAN

vs. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF PROVIDENCE, 68 A. 2d 32, as
quoted in 10 ALR 2d 789.
The "corporation" was involved in an operation
develop a mobile home park.

~

This operation included the

basic contract between the "corporation" and the "bank" for
a loan.

It also included a great number of contracts betwee·

contractors and subcontractors, and several contracts to
purchase property as well as various guarantees to Ogden Cit~
This appeal is in relation to a suit to foreclose on proper~
involved in one of these contracts.
The bank breached its duty not to interfere with
the contract between Corporation Nine and the Huggins in twc
ways.

First, the bank refused to disperse the final $21,00ij

of the loan contract.

Second, the bank, through Alan Nye,

prevented performance on the contract between the "corporati
and the Huggins.
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Corporation Nine entered into a loan agreement with
the "bank" to disperse $395,500.00.

(T-116)

Although

Corporation Nine did nothing to breach this agreement, the
bank refused to disperse the final $21,000.00 of this money.
( T-1 7 3 , 10 3)

Because of the refusal to disperse funds, the

"corporation" was prevented from honoring its agreements.
As a further consequence, the "corporation" was unable to put
the necessary finishing touches on the park.
the park wasn't finished.

The entrance to

The "corporation" wasn't able to

put sod or trees around most of the spaces.
sufficient funding to control the weeds.

There'was not

(T-104)

Without

these finishing touches, the park could not attract enough
business to provide the necessary cash flow.
The second interference was a direct result of Alan
Nye's breach of the duty which the "bank" owed to the "corporation."

The success of Gateway West depended on a cash

flow to pay the loan and other obligations, including the
mortgage on the Huggins property.

By misusing the infor-

mation in Corporation Nine's file and developing his own
mobile home park, Monte Vista, Alan Nye prevented this cash
flow from developing.

Because of the lack of cash flow

resulting from this breach, the "corporation" was unable to
meet its obligations.
I f Mr.

Nye had not been an officer of Commercial

Security Rank, he would not have had access to the information
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contained in the "corporation's" file.

His acts,

althou~

for his own interest, are attributable to the bank because
of his position as a director and because of the duty of the
"bank" not to interfere with the "corporation's" contracb.

The damage to Corporation Nine is actual and real. ]
Because of the interference with the contract, the "corpora·
tion" was unable to maintain its mortgage payments and is
now in danger of losing the property.
In summary, the high standard established in Point
One for the granting of a directed verdict should be applied
to the facts set forth in Point Two.
differ as to the outcome of this case.

Reasonable men could
The directed verdict

should not have been granted.
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POINT THREE.
FORECLOSURE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURTS
It is clear from the case law and the statute
that foreclosure is governed by equitable principles. First
National Bank of Salt Lake City, vs. Haymond, 89 Utah 115,
57 P. 2d 1401, 1405.

It is equally clear that foreclosure

is in the nature of a forfeiture which the law does not
favor.

Jenson vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P. 2d 673;

Jacobson vs Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294.
The fundamental purpose of the foreclosure is to
insure payment of debts for which a mortgage stands as security, and foreclosure is allowed only when it is necessary to carry out that objective.

The Utah Court has

made this abundantly clear in United States vs. Loosey,
551 P. 2d 506, at 508; "The main purpose of a mortgage is
to insure the payment of the debt for which it stands as
security; and foreclosure is allowed when necessary to carry out that objective."

The Utah Supreme Court recently

stated in State Bank of Lehi vs. Woolsey, 565, P. 2d 413,
417; "Since a suit to foreclose a mortgage is an equitable
action, the chancellor has the right to deny foreclosure
based upon an acceleration where there are substantial
equities which would render the acceleration unconscionable."
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POINT FOUR.
FORECLOSURE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IS INEQUITABLE
AND UNJUST
The law in Utah regarding foreclosure is very clear.
It is in the nature of a forefeiture and is disfavored.
purpose is simply to guarantee payment of a debt.

Its

Fore-

closure based on acceleration may be denied if equity
justifys.
The facts in the present case are equally clear and
uncontested.

The "corporation" was always, willing and able

to bring current all principal and interest due.
It is clear and uncontested that in the four and onehalf years the Huggins held the mortgage, they at no time
took action to accelerate the debt nor to demand strict compliance with terms of the note and mortgage.

Yet, within

seven days of the mortgage assignment, this "bank" filed
suit to foreclose on the mortgage.

This suit by the "bank"

was the first notice which the "corporation" had of any
change of interest in the mortgage.
It would be unjust to allow the "bank" to purchase the
note and mortgage, then inunediately bring an action for foreclosure without giving notice of their interest and their
intent to require strict compliance.

- 14 -
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To allow such action would encourage a type of
modern day headhunting.

An institution could look for

mortgaged property in a situation similar to the "corporation's".

Acquire that mortgage and then, within days and

without any notice, proceed to foreclose on the mortgage.
This type of action should be against public policy because the purpose of a mortgage and a foreclosure action is to guarantee payment of a debt, not to facilitate
land grabbing.
In Woolsey, Supra, the Supreme Court held that if
equity necessitates a foreclosure based on acceleration
may be denied.

In the present situation, the "bank"

made no demand nor gave any notice of its intent to require strict compliance.

When the "corporation" became

aware of the change in interest, it immediately tendered
all sums which were due and owing.
To allow Commercial Security Bank to foreclose
in this case becomes manifestly unjust in the light of
Corporation Nine's continuing tender of the principal and
interest.

As is made abundantly clear in the cases, fore-

closure is only for the purpose of securing a debt, and an
inequitable foreclosure based on acceleration must be
denied
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In order to satisfy the demands of equity the summary judgment should have been granted.
Failing this appropriate remedy, the standard, previously enumerated in Point One regarding a directed verdict, should be applied and the issue should be submitted
to a jury.
POINT FIVE
THE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED BY THE JURY AS AN OFFSET.
Even if the Court were to find the counter-claim
of the "corporation" were insufficient, the foreclosure shoui
still be sent to the jury to determine if the damages claimei
by the "corporation" are allowable offsets against the

mar~

There would include the cost of the materials in
Corporation Nine's file, the value of the corporate guarante;
to bring Seventh Street through the Huggin's property, the
cost of on-site improvements, and the other elements constituting damage on the counter-claim.
CONCLUSION
It is clear the bank owed the corporation a duty
not to interfere with the contract rights of the "corporation" or to prevent perfomrance by the "corporation."

It io
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equally clear that Alan Nye, but for his position as "boss"
would not have had access to the "corporation's" file.

But

for Nye's building a second park on the order and type of
Gateway West, the "corporation" would not have suffered
damage.
Case law clearly defines the purpose of a mortgage
and foreclosure.

The only purpose of the foreclosure is to

insure payments of the debt for which the mortgage stands as
security.
The bank made no demands for payment from the ·
corporation before filing suit.

This is manifestly unjust

in light of the prior four and one-half years in which strict
compliance with the mortgage had not been required.

This

inequity becomes even more egregious in light of the
"corporation's" continuing tender of all monies and interest
due.
Viewing both of the above issues on balance, they
do not pass the high standard required for a directed verdict.
If all the reasonable inferences are drawn from the "corporation's" evidence, while discounting the bank's evidence,
reasonable people must differ with the Court's directed
verdict.

,}~J,'1h~
C0011aQd

C. ffiughes

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology
- 17 Act,
- administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

